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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of clustering in metric spaces while preserving the privacy of individ-
ual data. Specifically, we examine differentially private variants of the k-medians and Euclidean k-means
problems. We present polynomial algorithms with constant multiplicative error and lower additive er-
ror than the previous state-of-the-art for each problem. Additionally, our algorithms use a clustering
algorithm without differential privacy as a black-box. This allows practitioners to control the trade-off
between runtime and approximation factor by choosing a suitable clustering algorithm to use.
1 Introduction
In this work, we study the problem of clustering while preserving the privacy of individuals in the dataset.
Clustering is an important routine in many machine learning tasks, such as image segmentation [24, 21],
collaborative filtering [16, 22], and time series analysis [18]. Thus, improving the performance of private
clustering has a great potential for improving other private machine learning tasks. We consider the clustering
problem with differential privacy, which is a privacy framework that requires the algorithm to be insensitive
to small changes in the dataset [9]. Formally, suppose we are given a metric d, a set V of n points in the
metric, and a (private) set of demand points D ⊆ V . Our objective is to choose a set F ⊂ V of size k to
minimize the following objective: ∑
v∈V
min
f∈F
d(v, f)p (1)
This is the k-medians problem when p = 1 and the k-means problem when p = 2.
The k-medians problem has been studied extensively in the literature. Previous work in [15] proved that
k-medians is NP-hard. There is a long line of works on approximation algorithms for k-medians without
differential privacy [6, 1, 5, 14, 13, 4]. The state of the art is a 2.675 + ǫ approximation by [4]. The private
k-medians problem was studied in [12], which shows that any (ǫp, 0)-differentially private algorithm for the
k-median problem must have cost at least OPT +Ω(∆ · k ln(n/k)/ǫp), where OPT is the optimal cost. The
paper also provided a polynomial time (ǫp, 0)-differentially private algorithm that solves the problem with
with costs at most 6OPT + O(k2 log2 n/ǫp). [23] states a variant of the algorithm for (ǫp, δp)-differential
privacy with cost
O
(
OPT +
∆k1.5
ǫp
log
n
β
√
logn · log(1/δp)
)
where β is the failure probability.
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Reference Objective Multiplicative Error Additive Error
Gupta et al. [12], k-medians1 O(1) O(k logn)2
Stemmer et al. [23] O(k logn)1.5
Ours k-medians O(1) O(k logn)
Feldman et al. [11] Euclidean k-means O(k logn) O
(
k
√
d log(nd) · 9log∗(|X|
√
d)
)
2
Balcan et al. [2] Euclidean k-means O
(
log3 n
)
O
((
k2 + d
)
log5 n
)
Stemmer et al. [23] Euclidean k-means O(1) O
(
(k log (n log k))1.5
+d0.51(log logn)2.53 (k log k)
1.01 )
Ours Euclidean k-means O(1) O
(
k logn
+d0.51(log logn)2.53 (k log k)
1.01 )
Table 1: Comparison of our clustering algorithms with prior works, omitting dependence on ǫp, δp.
Our contribution is a new polynomial time (ǫp, δp)-differentially private k-medians algorithm with
constant multiplicative factor and improved additive error:
O
(
OPT +
k∆
ǫp
logn log
(
e
δp
))
Note that our additive error is linear in k instead of k1.5 as in the previous work by [12, 23], and almost
matches the lower bound of [12] up to lower order terms (their original lower bound is for (ǫp, 0)-privacy but
it can be extended to (ǫp, δp) privacy with inverse polynomial δp). By using the non-private algorithm of [4]
as a subroutine, our multiplicative factor is 6.35 + ǫ, which is slightly worse than 6 from [12].
The k-means problem has also been studied extensively with a long line of works on privacy preserving
approximation algorithms [3, 19, 10, 11, 2, 23]. As an extension of our techniques, we also provide an (ǫp, δp)-
differentially private algorithm for the Euclidean k-means problem with constant multiplicative error and
better additive cost compared to previous work (see table 1). Our algorithm has cost:
O
(
OPT + k logn+ d0.51(log logn)2.53 (k log k)1.01
)
Again in this setting, our additive error is almost linear in k as opposed to k1.5 in previous work [23].
In addition to improved performance guarantee, our k-medians and Euclidean k-means algorithms use
a non-private clustering algorithm as a black-box. This allows practitioner to control the trade-off between
approximation guarantee and runtime of the clustering algorithm and even use heuristics with good empirical
performance.
Our techniques for k-medians and Euclidean k-means include two main steps. In the first step, we
iterate through distance thresholds from small to large and apply a differentially private Maximum Coverage
algorithm to select centers that cover almost as many points as the optimal solution at those thresholds. For
the second step, we create a new dataset based on the potential centers and apply a non-private clustering
algorithm on this dataset. The new dataset is created by moving each demand points to the nearest potential
center, and then applying the Laplace mechanism [8] to report the number of points at each potential center.
This makes sure that privacy is preserved for the new dataset and no additional privacy cost when we apply
the non-private clustering algorithm in the final step.
2 Related Works
Table 1 summarizes the performance of previous work in comparison with our algorithms. In the table,
only the work by [12] is for (ǫp, 0)-differential privacy, while the others are for (ǫp, δp)-differential privacy. As
1The bound in [12] is for ǫ-differential privacy, while [23] is for δ-approximate ǫ-differential privacy.
2[11] studies the discrete d-dimensional space Xd.
2
mentioned above, [12] gave the first private k-medians algorithmwith a constant multiplicative approximation
and additive error polynomial in the number of centers and logarithmic in the number of points. The
algorithm uses the local search approach of [1]. Our algorithm, on the other hand, can be used with any
non-private k-medians algorithm.
For the Euclidean k-means problem, [2] proposes the strategy of first identifying a set of potential centers
with low k-means cost, then applying the techniques of [12] to find the final centers among the potential
centers. However, their potential centers are only guaranteed to contain a solution with multiplicative
approximation O
(
log3 n
)
. This result was improved by [23], which can construct a set of potential centers
containing a solution with constant multiplicative approximation.
Another approach for the k-means problem is via the 1-cluster problem. Given a set of input points in
R
d and t ≤ n, the goal is to find a center that covers at least t points with the smallest radius. The work of
[11] shows that the k-means problem can solved by running the algorithm for the 1-cluster problem multiple
time to find several balls to cover most of data points with O(k logn) multiplicative error. [20] proposed an
improved algorithm for the 1-cluster problem, resulting in a differentially private k-means algorithm with
O(k) multiplicative error.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Differential privacy
Differential privacy is a privacy definition for computations run against sensitive input data sets. Its require-
ment, informally, is that the computation behaves similarly on two input dataset that are nearly identical.
Formally,
Definition 3.1. ([7]) A randomized algorithm M has δp-approximate ǫp-differential privacy, or (ǫp, δp)-
differential privacy, if for any two input sets A and B with a symmetric difference which has a single
element, and for any set of outcomes S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(A) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫp)× Pr[M(B) ∈ S] + δp .
If δp = 0, we say that M is ǫp-differentially private. An algorithm with (ǫp, 0)-differntial privacy ensures
that the output M(A) is (almost) equally likely to be observed on neighboring datasets, whereas in (ǫp, δp)-
differential privacy, δp dictates the probability that ǫp-privacy fails to hold [7]. In this way, (ǫp, δp)-differential
privacy is a relaxation of ǫp-differential privacy. We use an error parameter ǫ for utility and we use ǫp and δp
to denote parameters for differential privacy (or ǫs and δs for algorithm 1, to differentiate privacy parameters
to different algorithms).
One of the most basic constructions for differentially private algorithms is the Laplace mechanism.
Definition 3.2. (L1 sensitivity) A function f : N
|X| → Rk has L1 sensitivty ∆f if ‖f(A)− f(A′)‖1 ≤ ∆f
for all A,A′ with a symmetric difference which has a single element.
Theorem 3.3. (Laplace mechanism [8]) Let function f : N|X| → Rk have L1 sensitivty ∆f and ǫp > 0.
Mechanism M that on input A outputs f(A) + Lap(∆fǫp ) is (ǫp, 0)-differentially private, where Lap(
∆f
ǫp
)
denotes a random variable following Laplace distribution with scale parameter b = ∆fǫp .
Another tool for construction of differential private algorithm we use in this work is the exponential
mechanism. This construction is parameterized by a query function q(A, r) mapping a pair of input data set
A and candidate result r to a real valued. With q and a privacy value ǫp, the mechanism selects an output
in favor of high score value:
Pr[Eǫq(A) = r] ∝ exp(ǫpq(A, r)) (2)
Theorem 3.4. ([17]) The exponential mechanism, when used to select an output r ∈ R gives 2ǫp∆-
differential privacy, letting ROPT be the subset of R achieving q(A, r) = maxr q(A, r), ensures that
Pr[q(A, Eǫq(A)) < maxr q(A, r) − ln(|R|/|ROPT|)/ǫp − t/ǫp] ≤ exp(−t)
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3.2 Maximum Coverage
Algorithm 1: Maximum Coverage
Input: Set system (U,S), a private set R ⊂ U
to cover, ǫs, δs, m
i← 1, Ri = R, Si ← S. ǫ′ ← ǫs/2 ln( eδs ).
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m do
Pick a set S from Si with probability
proportional to exp(ǫ′|S ∩Ri|).
Output set S.
Ri+1 ← Ri \ S, Si+1 ← Si − {S}.
end
Our differentially private k-medians algorithm
solves the MaximumCoverage problem as a subprob-
lem. The Maximum Coverage problem is defined as
follows: on a universe U of items and a family S
of subsets of U , and a parameter z, the goal is to
select z sets in S to cover the most elements of U .
Formally, we are looking to find
arg max
C⊆S,|C|=z
∣∣∣⋃
c∈C
c
∣∣∣.
Our approach for solving private Maximum Cov-
erage is based on the Unweighted Set Cover algo-
rithm in [12]. To preserve privacy, algorithm 1 chooses sets using the exponential mechanism, with probability
related to the improvement in coverage caused by choosing the set.
Assume that there exists a selection of z sets that covers U . A classic fact for the maximum coverage
problem is that if we build the family C by always selecting the item in S \ C that covers the largest number
of uncovered elements in U , then after z iterations, | ∪c∈C c| ≥ (1 − 1/e)|U|. Here we show an observation
that will be useful for our algorithm later. The proof is in the appendix.
Lemma 3.5. For ǫ > 0, if we always select a set that covers at least half as many uncovered elements as
the set that covers the most uncovered elements, then after 2z ln 1/ǫ iteration,
∣∣∣⋃c∈C c∣∣∣ ≥ (1 − ǫ)|U|.
4 Private k-medians
Given a set of points V , a metric d : V ×V → R, a private set of demand points D ⊆ V , and a value k < |V |,
the objective of the k-medians problem is to select a set of points (centers) F ⊂ V , |F | = k to minimize
cost(F ) =
∑
v∈D d(v, F ), where d(v, F ) = minf∈F d(v, f). Let ∆ = maxu,v∈V d(u, v) be the diameter of the
metric space. We use ǫ as the approximation parameter for maximum coverage problem in lemma 3.5, and
ǫp and δp as privacy parameters. Let Bt(v) be the ball of radius t centered at v i.e. the set of all points in
the metric space within distance t from v.
Our approach is based on the Maximum Coverage problem. One way to compute the clustering cost is
by computing for every distance threshold t, the number of points within distance t from the centers and
integrating the counts from 0 to the maximum distance. Thus, if for every threshold t the number of points
farther than t from the our solution’s centers is not much more than the number of points farther than
t from the optimal centers, then our cost is not much larger than the optimal cost. Thus, our algorithm
goes through distance thresholds from small to large and tries to “cover” as many points as possible using
fresh centers every time. For each threshold, we aim to cover 1 − ǫ times the number of points the optimal
solution can cover. The result is that our clustering cost is not much larger than the optimal cost, albeit
using more centers. Since we use exponentially growing thresholds, we only use O(log n) times more centers,
which results in a small error due to privacy noise. The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 2.
The algorithm begins with the discretization of distance thresholds. The goal is similar to our discussion
above. We apply algorithm 1 to select a set of points that cover a large set of demand points across different
distance thresholds. Note that the objective cost of any set of center following the discretization scheme is
not too far from the actual costs, as we will show in lemma 4.3. Thus, the set of centers that we find across
different thresholds t should also have cost similar to OPT.
Our final step is to obtain the final set of centers from the potential centers. To preserve privacy for this
step, we create a new dataset similar to the original one with some privacy. In this new dataset, every demand
point is shifted towards the closest center from the previous step, and we apply the Laplace mechanism to the
assigned number of demands points of each center to preserve privacy. At this point, we can use a k-medians
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Algorithm 2: The k-medians algorithm
Input: a set of points V , a private set of demand points D ⊆ V , a metric d, ǫ, ǫp, δp
1 V ′ = D,C = ∅, r = ⌈1 + log1+ǫ n⌉
2 for i from 1 to r do
3 Set ti = (1 + ǫ)
i−1∆/n
4 Run algorithm 1 for the set system U = V,S = {Bti(v) ∩ V ′ : v ∈ V }, with ǫs = ǫp2 , δs = δp for
m = 2k ln(1/ǫ) iterations to get Ci
5 Vi =
⋃
v∈Ci Bti(v) ∩ V ′
6 V ′ = V ′ \ Vi
7 C = C ∪ Ci
8 end
9 Assign each point in D to its closest point c ∈ C
10 Let nc be the total number of points assigned to c for each c ∈ C
11 For each c ∈ C, set n′c = nc + Yc where Yc ∼ Lap
(
2
ǫp
)
12 Run a k-medians algorithm to select k centers from V , with demand points at each c ∈ C with
multiplicity n′c
algorithm on this dataset to output the final k centers. In this new problem, although the objective changes
because of shifting and the Laplace mechanism, the point that can be selected to be centers are the same as
before. Thus, the cost of the centers returned in the final step is at most the the cost of this new objective
plus the total shifting distance. In the following sections, we will first analyze the privacy and then the
utility of this algorithm.
4.1 Privacy Analysis
We first show that this algorithm is (ǫp, δp) differentially private. To show this, we first show that the entirety
of the for loop is (ǫp/2, δp) differentially private, and then take advantage of composition and apply lemma
3.3 at line 12 to obtain the final result. Note that the analysis of the loop very closely follows the proof for
privacy of Unweighted Set Cover in [12]; their algorithm selects sets in a particular order to form a cover,
while our algorithm selects candidate centers with increasing distance thresholds, where a center is assumed
to cover all demand points within its distance threshold. The significant difference in the two proofs is that
our algorithm could select the same center twice with different distance thresholds while a set will never be
chosen twice in set cover in [12]. This re-selection of the same center will not affect the differential privacy
of the algorithm, because the privacy analysis hinges on which demand points have been covered, not which
centers have been selected. As a result of this, we save an additional logn factor on privacy, which removes
a logn term from the additive error in lemma 4.4 which carries through the additive error in the utility. We
include the proof in the appendix and omit it here, due to its close similarity to [12].
Lemma 4.1. The for loop in algorithm 2 preserves (ǫp/2, δp) differential privacy.
The function affected by the Laplace mechanism in line 11 returns a vector of the counts nc. In the case
of sets A,A′ as in theorem 3.3, the difference between f(A) and f(A′) is exactly one for one item in this
vector, and therefore ‖f(A) − f(A′)‖ = 1, so the function has L1 sensitivity 1. Thus, line 11 is (ǫp/2, 0)
differentially private by theorem 3.3. By composition, this fact and lemma 4.1 yield the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2. Algorithm 2 is (ǫp, δp) differentially private.
4.2 Utility Analysis
We define t0 = 0, t1 =
∆
n , t2 =
∆(1+ǫ)
n , ..., tr = ∆ as shorthand for the thresholds. Also, let oi be the number
of points at distance in the range [ti−1, ti) from their center in the optimal solution (which we denote OPT),
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and let ai be the the number of points at distance in the range [ti−1, ti) from their closest point in C after
the for-loop in algorithm 2. To bound the performance of our solution, we first show that discretizing the
distance thresholds at ti’s instead of integrating from 0 to ∆ introduces negligible error to the cost of the
solution (see Lemma 4.3). Next, for each distance threshold, lemma 4.4 uses the approximation guarantee
of maximum coverage to show that we are efficiently covering demand points using not many more centers
than OPT. Crucially, lemma 4.5 shows that by covering almost as well as OPT at every distance threshold,
our solution has cost not much more than that of OPT.
The following lemmas bound OPT by the threshold approximation and then bound our solution by that
approximation respectively.
Lemma 4.3.
∑
i=1 oiti ≤ (1 + ǫ)OPT +∆
Proof. On all u ∈ D and set of centers F , define d′(u, F ) as the minimum distance threshold ti which is
larger than d(u, F ). If d(u,OPT) > ∆n2 then d
′(u,OPT) ≤ (1 + ǫ)d(u,OPT). If d(u,OPT) ≤ ∆n2 , then
d′(u,OPT) = ∆n ≤ d(u,OPT) + ∆n . Summing over d ∈ D yields the bound.
For each distance threshold ti, the following lemma shows that the algorithm covers almost as many
points as OPT. Its proof is left in the appendix. The result follows mostly from lemma 3.5 and the error of
the exponential mechanism in algorithm 1.
Lemma 4.4. Consider iteration i of the for-loop and let Mi be the maximum coverage of k centers with
radius ti over points in V
′. With high probability, at line 5, |Vi| ≥ (1− ǫ)Mi −
24k lnn ln
(
e
δp
)
ǫp
.
The next lemma relates the cost of our solution and that of OPT given that we cover almost as well as
OPT at every distance threshold.
Lemma 4.5.
∑r
i=1 aiti ≤ 1−ǫ1−ǫ−ǫ2
∑
i=1 oiti +
24∆k lnn ln
(
e
δp
)
ǫp(1−ǫ−ǫ2)
Proof. Let Oi =
∑r
j=i oj , Ai =
∑r
j=i aj and E =
24k lnn ln
(
e
δp
)
ǫp
. Given a threshold ti, we know that the
centers in OPT cover n − Oi+1 points with distance at most ti. At threshold ti, algorithm 2 has already
covered n−Ai points so we know that there is a solution covering at additional (n−Oi+1)−(n−Ai) = Ai−Oi+1
points. By the guarantee of the greedy set cover algorithm in lemma 4.4, we cover ai ≥ (1−ǫ)(Ai−Oi+1)−E
new points on the next iteration. By substituting Ai = ai + Ai+1, we have ai ≥ (1−ǫ)ǫ (Ai+1 − Oi+1) − Eǫ .
Notice that:
r∑
i=1
aiti =
r∑
i=1
Ai(ti − ti−1) ≤
r∑
i=1
(
ǫai−1
1− ǫ +Oi +
E
1− ǫ
)
(ti − ti−1)
=
r∑
i=1
ǫai−1
1− ǫ (ti − ti−1) +
r∑
i=1
oiti +
∆E
1− ǫ
The equality is because of the telescoping sums. Also notice that:
r∑
i=1
ǫai−1
1− ǫ (ti − ti−1) =
r−1∑
i=1
ǫai
1− ǫ (ti+1 − ti) ≤
r−1∑
i=1
ǫ2
1− ǫaiti
The last inequality is because for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, ti+1 = (1 + ǫ)ti by definition. We are also able to
drop the term i = 0 from the last two sums because a0 = 0.
Thus:
r∑
i=1
aiti −
r−1∑
i=1
ǫ2
1− ǫaiti =
1− ǫ− ǫ2
1− ǫ
r−1∑
i=1
aiti + artr ≤
∑
i=1
oiti +
∆E
1− ǫ
=⇒
r∑
i=1
aiti ≤ 1− ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
∑
i=1
oiti + (1− ǫ− ǫ2)∆E
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Combining the results of lemmas 4.3 and 4.5, we see that
r∑
i=1
aiti ≤ 1− ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2 ((1 + ǫ)OPT +∆) + (1− ǫ− ǫ
2)∆E
which gives us a bound on the cost of snapping points in D to points in C.
Lemma 4.6. Consider the k-medians problem in the last line of algorithm 2, where demand points in D are
shifted to points in C and Laplace noise is applied. With high probability, the optimal objective cost of this
new k-medians problem is at most
OPT +
∑
aiti +
4∆k ln(1/ǫ)
ǫp
(
ln(n)
ln(1 + ǫ)
+ 2
)
where OPT is the cost of the original k-medians problem.
We leave the details of this proof in the appendix. Briefly, we can choose OPT of the original problem as
a solution to the new problem. In this case, the original points get the cost of OPT plus the cost of snapping
to the centers in C, which is
∑
aiti. The last term is an upper bound on the error from using the Laplace
mechanism, with high probability.
Using an approximation algorithm for the k-medians problem with approximation factor M in the last
step of algorithm 2, the entire cost gains a multiplicative factor M . Therefore, we can summarize the utility
of algorithm 2 into the following lemma and even simpler theorem:
Lemma 4.7. With high probability, algorithm 2 preserves (ǫp, δp) differential privacy and solves the k-
medians problem with cost
O (M(1 + ǫ))OPT +O
(
Mk∆
ǫp
lnn
(
ln
(
e
δp
)
+
ln(1/ǫ)
ln(1 + ǫ)
))
where the black-box k-medians algorithm used in the last step of algorithm 2 has approximation factor M and
ǫ is a small, positive constant.
The full proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix. In short, we merge the results of lemmas 4.3,
4.5, and 4.6, and bound the final cost using the private problem’s cost, the snapping cost, and the triangle
inequality.
Corollary 4.8. By using a constant approximation non-private algorithm for k-medians, there is a (ǫp, δp)-
differentially private algorithm for the k-medians problem that, with high probability, outputs a solution at
cost
O
(
OPT +
k∆
ǫp
ln(n)
(
ln
(
1
δp
)
+
ln(1/ǫ)
ln(1 + ǫ)
))
.
Note that our algorithm allows for any k-medians algorithm to be used at the last step. One can choose
a preferred trade-off between runtime and performance to select a suitable algorithm. This is in contrast to
the approach in [12], where the algorithm builds on the k-median algorithm in [1].
5 Application to Euclidean k-means
In the Euclidean k-medians problem, instead of having a discrete set of demand points, V is defined to be
all of Rd. We wish to select a set of points (centers) F ⊂ Rd, |F | = k to minimize cost(F ) =∑v∈D d(v, F )2.
In this section, we will apply our result to improve additive error in the approach in [23].
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The strategy in [23] is to first identify a polynomial set of candidate centers such that it contains a subset
of k candidate centers with low k-means cost. Then, the algorithm uses a private discrete k-means algorithm
to select the final k-centers with low cost from the set of candidate center. More concretely, the algorithms
in [23] is guaranteed to output a (ǫp, δp)-private set of candidate centers Y of size at most ǫpn log(
k
β ) such
that with probability at least 1− β, there exist a subset of size k center with constant multiplicative error
and additive error of O(T
1
1−a−b ·w 11−a−b ·k 11−a−b )∆2, where a, b are small constant parameters of the Locality
Sensitive Hashing algorithm used in [23], T = Θ(log logn) and
w = O
(√
d
ǫp
· log logn · log
(
k
β
)√
log
log logn
δp
)
Note that a, b can be chosen arbitrarily small at the cost of making the multiplicative approximation factor
a larger constant. The work of [23] focuses on the regime where a, b are small and 1/(1− a− b) ≤ 1.01. The
resulting additive error for identifying candidate centers is O˜ǫp,δp(k
1.01d.51).
The performance bottleneck of the Euclidean k-means is in the algorithm to select the final k centers
from a candidate set. We can apply our algorithm on the potential center returned by [23] to improve the
algorithm performance. Note that our algorithm can be applied to solve the k-means objective by passing
the correct distance function. Although the squared root of Euclidean distance is not a metric, we can still
apply the same algorithm and analysis to get the bound for k-means objective. The only difference is at the
last step, instead of running a k-medians algorithm on the returned center, we run a k-means algorithm to
get final centers.
Rather than replicate the entire proof, we will only review the sections which are affected by the change
in the distance function. Furthermore, we will extend the proof to all distance functions dp for any natural
number p.
Notably, the privacy analysis is independent of the distance function, and is therefore unaffected. In fact,
the only steps in the proofs of section 4 which involve the distance function are lemma 4.3 and lemmas 4.6
and 4.7. For the distance function dp, lemma 4.3 is amended as follows:
Lemma 5.1.
∑
i=1 oiti ≤ (1 + ǫ)pOPT+∆
Proof. In the case where (d(u,OPT))p > ∆n2 , now (d
′(u,OPT))p ≤ (1 + ǫ)p(d(u,OPT))p. Otherwise, the
proof is functionally identical to that of lemma 4.3.
For lemmas 4.6 and 4.7, we directly address and resolve the main issue the distance function faces here,
which is that the triangle inequality does not hold when p > 1. However, we can use the following lemma,
which we prove in the appendix:
Lemma 5.2. In any metric space and p ≥ 1, (d(a, b))p ≤ 2p−1 ((d(a, c))p + (d(b, c))p).
Using this lemma, we see that when the triangle inequality would be applied, we gain an additional 2p−1
constant. This affects the leading constant of the approximation factor and additive error, but does not
affect the asymptotic cost.
When p = 2, this is the distance function used in the k-means problem. Therefore, the only changes to
2 necessary to make it a functional k-means algorithm are to use the proper input metric d and to run a
black-box k-means algorithm as the last step rather than a black-box k-medians algorithm. Then, if we are
trying to minimize the objective function using the distance function dp and we use a black-box algorithm
for this objective function at the last step of algorithm 2, the proofs in section 4 using lemma 5.1 instead of
4.3 yields the following lemma and corollary:
Lemma 5.3. Given a problem equivalent to k-means but with distance function dp, and a discrete algorithm
for that problem with approximation factor M , there exists an (ǫp, δp) differentially-private algorithm for that
problem which, with high probability, has objective cost at most
O
(
2p−1M(1 + ǫ)p
)
OPT +O
(
Mk∆p
ǫp
(
lnn+ 2p−1 ln |Y | ln
(
e
δp
)))
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Corollary 5.4. There is a (ǫp, δp)-differentially private algorithm for the Euclidean k-means problem that
with probability at least 1 − β returns a solution with a constant multiplicative factor and an additive error
of
O
(
∆2
(
T
1
1−a−b · w 11−a−b · k 11−a−b
)
+
∆2k
ǫp
(
lnn+ ln
(
ǫpn log
(
k
β
))
ln
(
e
δp
)))
Note that our algorithm results in better additive term compared to applying [12] on the potential centers.
Specifically, the second additive term is almost linear in k instead of k1.5, making the entire additive error
almost linear in k.
6 Broader Impact Statement
Clustering has many applications in machine learning, such as image segmentation [24, 21], collaborative
filtering [16, 22], and time series analysis [18]. Privacy is a major concern when input data contains sensitive
information. Differential privacy [8] has become a rigorous framework for ensuring privacy in algorithms.
Thus, differentially private algorithms for clustering problem would ensure for each individual in the input
a robust privacy guarantee.
Our improved utility guarantee will perhaps encourage adoption of privacy-preserving algorithm as a
replacement of the non-private counterpart. Furthermore, our approach allows for usage with other clustering
algorithm as a black-blox. We believe this further improves the applicability of private clustering algorithms,
making it easier to incorporate privacy guarantee into existing clustering frameworks. The limitations of
the work are that the privacy guarantee requires certain assumptions on the input data such as the data
being bounded and the utility guarantee has additive error that is only meaningful when the dataset has
a large enough number of participants. When applying the algorithm, the curator has to ensure that the
assumptions hold to protect the privacy of the participants.
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A Missing proofs
Theorem A.1. If Z1, Z2, ...Zn are i.i.d random variables that follow exponential distrubtion with parameter
λ > 0, then Pr[
∑n
i=1 Zi ≥ 2nλ] ≤
(
2
e
)n
Proof. Recall that the moment generating function of Zi is E[exp(tZi)] =
λ
λ−t for t < λ and the fact that
E [exp (t
∑n
i=1 Zi)] =
(
λ
λ−t
)n
based on the property of moment generating function. We have:
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Zi ≥ 2n/λ
]
= Pr
[
exp
(
t
n∑
i=1
Zi
)
≥ exp (2tn/λ)
]
≤ E
[
exp
(
t
n∑
i=1
Zi
)]
/ exp(2tn/λ)
=
(
λ
(λ− t) exp(2t/λ)
)n
The inequality follows from Markov’s inequality. Let t = λ/2, we have the theorem.
Lemma A.2. (Lemma 3.5) For ǫ > 0, if we always select a set covers at least half of the number of elements
in the set that covers the most uncovered elements, then after 2z ln 1/ǫ iteration,
∣∣∣⋃c∈C c∣∣∣ ≥ (1− ǫ)|U|.
Proof. Define Uj to be the number of uncovered elements after j iterations and Aj to be the number of
newly covered element at iteration j. We will first show that Uj+1 ≤ (1 − 12z )j+1|U|. We will prove by
induction. For the base case j = 0, We know for each iteration there exists some set that can cover at least
1/z of the remaining uncovered elements. Otherwise, it’s not possible to cover all elements with only just z
steps by the optimal solution. Thus, because we always select at least half of the number of elements in the
set that covers the most uncovered elements, Aj ≥ Uj−12z . This proves the base case. Now for the inductive
hypothesis, assume that Uj ≤ (1 − 12z )i|U|. Because of the base case we have:
Uj+1 ≤ Uj − Uj/2z =⇒ Uj+1 ≤ (1− 1
2z
)i|U|(1 − 1
2z
) = (1 − 1
2z
)i+1|U|
where the last inequality we used the induction hypothesis.
Now, note that if there are z · i iterations :
Uz·i ≤
[
(1 − 1
2z
)
]z·i
|U| ≤
(
1
e
)i/2
|U|
For i ≥ 2 ln 1ǫ , observe that the RHS is at most (1 − ǫ)|U|, as desired.
Lemma A.3. (Lemma 4.1) The for loop in algorithm 2 preserves (ǫp/2, δp) differential privacy.
Proof. Let A and B be two sets of demand points from the same point set V , such that A and B have a
symmetric difference to be a single element I ∈ V . For the sake of this proof, we care about the order in
which points from V were selected by the iterations of algorithm 1. Furthermore, the same point v ∈ V may
be selected in multiple iterations of algorithm 1, by being chosen at different thresholds. In order to consider
these as separate instances, we will record the order of selected points with the current threshold, as (point,
threshold) pairs. We will denote the order of (point, threshold) pairs selected on input A as πA, and on
input B as πB . Note that on any set of demand points, the total number of selections is the same for each
iteration of algorithm 1, so when checking equality of two selections π1 and π2 from the same set of points
V , the thresholds in the pairs should always match, and equality depends only on the points in the pairs.
First, we want to fix some order π and bound the ratio between Pr[πA = π] and Pr[πB = π]. Fix π.
We denote by h the total selections in all calls to algorithm 1 in the for loop. Note that this value h is
independent of D given V , and is therefore equivalent for both A and B. We will also write si,j(D) to denote
the size of Sj in algorithm 1 (which is the updated value of V ′ after each iteration of the for loop) after
11
i− 1 sets have been added to the cover when the demand set is D. Then, the probability we make the same
choice as π on iteration i given that we made the same choices as π on the first i− 1 iterations is given by
exp (ǫ′ · si,πi(D))∑
j exp (ǫ
′ · si,j(D))
where the numerator is the relative probability that algorithm 1 picks πi, and the denominator is the sum
of relative probabilities of all possible choices j. Therefore,
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
=
h∏
i=1
(
exp(ǫ′ · si,πi(A))/(
∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A)))
exp(ǫ′ · si,πi(B))/(
∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(B)))
)
=
exp(ǫ′ · st,πt(A))
exp(ǫ′ · st,πt(B))
·
t∏
i=1
(∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(B))∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A))
)
where t is such the first set in π containing I is Sπt . After t choices, the remaining demand points for A
and B are identical since I is covered, and therefore all the following probabilities are equivalent and the
terms cancel to multiplicative factor 1. Also, since the items in π before πt do not contain I, the relative
probabilities of choosing those items is the same, so the numerators cancel for those indices.
If A contains I and B does not, then the first term is exp(ǫ′) since st,πt(A) = st,πt(B)+1, and each term
in the product is at most 1, since si,j(A) ≥ si,j(B). Therefore, the whole term is at most exp(ǫ′). Since
ǫ′ ≤ ǫs for δp = δs ≤ 1, it follows that the for loop is (ǫp/2, 0) differentially private for this case, which shows
the weaker (ǫp/2, δp) differential privacy.
Now, suppose B contains I and A does not. In this case, the first term is exp(−ǫ′) < 1. In instance B,
every (point, threshold) pair which contains I covers exactly 1 more item than that pair in A, and all others
remain the same size. We denote the set of such pairs as SI . Therefore, we have:
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
≤
t∏
i=1
(
(exp(ǫ′)− 1) ·∑j∈SI exp(ǫ′ · si,j(A)) +∑j exp(ǫ′ · si,j(A))∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A))
)
=
t∏
i=1
(1 + (exp(ǫ′)− 1) · pi(A))
≤
t∏
i=1
exp((exp(ǫ′)− 1) · pi(A))
where pi(A) is the probability that a set containing I is chosen at step i of the algorithm running on instance
A, conditioned on picking the sets Sπ1 , . . . , Sπi−1 in the previous steps. The last step follows because
1 + x ≤ exp (x) when x ≥ 0.
For an instance A and an element I ∈ A, we say that an order of chosen (point, threshold) pairs σ is
q-bad if the sum
∑
i pi(A)1(I uncovered at step i) is larger than q, where pi(A) is as defined above. We call
σ q-good if it is not q-bad. We first consider the case when π is (ln δ−1p )-good. Since the index t corresponds
to the first set in π containing I, we have
t−1∑
i=1
pi(A) ≤ ln δ−1p .
Continuing the earlier analysis,
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
≤
t∏
i=1
exp((exp(ǫ′)− 1)pi(A)) ≤ exp(2ǫ′
t∑
i=1
pi(A))
≤ exp(2ǫ′(ln( 1
δp
) + pt(A))) ≤ exp(2ǫ′(ln( 1
δp
) + 1)) ≤ exp (ǫp/2).
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Thus, for any (ln δ−1p )-good output π, we have
Pr[M(A)=π]
Pr[M(B)=π] ≤ exp(ǫp/2). We can then invoke the following
lemma, which is posed as Lemma 6.4 and proved in appendix B in [12].
Lemma A.4. For any instance A and any I ∈ A, the probability that the output π is q-bad is bounded by
exp(−q).
Thus for any set P of series of choices, we have
Pr[M(A) ∈ P ]
=
∑
π∈P
Pr[M(A) = π]
=
∑
π∈P:π is (ln δ−1p )-good
Pr[M(A) = π] +
∑
π∈P:π is (ln δ−1p )-bad
Pr[M(A) = π]
≤
∑
π∈P:π is (ln δ−1p )-good
exp(ǫp/2)Pr[M(B) = π] + δp
≤ exp(ǫp/2)Pr[M(B) ∈ P ] + δp.
Therefore, we have shown (ǫp/2, δp) differential privacy in both cases.
Lemma A.5. (Lemma 4.4) Consider iteration i of the for-loop and let Mi be the maximum coverage of
k centers with radius ti over points in V
′. With high probability, at line 5, |Vi| ≥ (1− ǫ)Mi −
24k lnn ln
(
e
δp
)
ǫp
.
Proof. The items in the family S in line 4 are exactly one-to-one with the points in V , and the set sv ∈ S
corresponding to v ∈ V are exactly the points which are not within distance ti−1 of an existing center in C
but are within distance ti of v. Therefore, the items covered by the centers in Ci are all within distance ti
of their closest centers, so the change in the coverage of C is at least the size of the set coverage from Ci.
Our analysis is similar to [12]. The main difference is that instead of covering all points that OPT
can cover, we aim to cover a (1 − ǫ) portion within an additive error, hence we run 2k log(1/ǫ) iterations
instead of 2k logn. Consider |Ri| to be the number of remaining elements yet to be covered, and define
Li = maxS∈S |S ∩Ri|, the largest number of uncovered elements covered by any set in S.
By theorem 3.4, the exponential mechanism when selecting set ensures that with probability at most
1/n2 that we select a center with coverage less than Li − 3 lnnǫ′ . When Li > 6 lnnǫ′ , we are guaranteed to
choose a center that covers at least Li/2 points. Based on lemma 3.5, for each iteration, as long as Li >
6 lnn
ǫ′
we always takes the greedy option and are guaranteed to have |Ci| ≥ (1 − ǫ)Mi with probability at least
1 − 1n . However, when Li ≤ 6 lnnǫ′ , although we are not guaranteed to take the greedy action, there are at
most 6k lnnǫ′ yet to be covered by the algorithm compared to OPT at radius r. Thus, the algorithm loses at
most 6k lnnǫ′ points.
Lemma A.6. (Lemma 4.6) Consider the k-medians problem in the last line of algorithm 2, where demand
points in D are shifted to points in C and Laplacian noise is applied. With high probability, the optimal
objective cost of this new k-medians problem is at most
OPT +
∑
aiti +
4∆k ln(1/ǫ)
ǫp
(
ln(n)
ln(1 + ǫ)
+ 2
)
where OPT is the cost of the original k-medians problem.
Proof. After assigning every point in D to the closest points in C, we run a k-medians algorithm on a multiset
defined by C, where each element c ∈ C has multiplicity n′c as in line 11 of algorithm 2. Recall that the
absolute value of a random variable following Laplace distribution with parameter b follows an exponential
distribution with parameter 1b . Also, by theorem A.1, the sum of exponential variables will be less than
twice the expectation with high probability. For the sake of completeness, we include the proof of this fact
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in theorem A.1. It is also significant that, since we call algorithm 1 a total
⌈
log(1+ǫ) n+ 1
⌉
=
⌈
lnn
ln(1+ǫ) + 1
⌉
times with m = 2k ln(1/ǫ), we select at most |C| ≤ 2k ln(n) ln(1/ǫ)/ ln(1 + ǫ) + 2k ln(1/ǫ) centers before
calling the black-box k-medians algorithm. With all this preliminary information, we begin to prove the
claim.
The last term in the bound is obtained by the Laplace mechanism, where noise is applied to the counts of
each center c ∈ C. Each of the centers in C has Laplacian noise applied to it with parameter 2/ǫp. Therefore,
with high probability at most 4k ln(1/e)ǫp
(
ln(n)
ln(1+ǫ) + 2
)
demand points are "added" by line 11 of the algorithm,
and each of these points is at distance at most ∆ from their closest center, which yields the last term in the
bound.
The first two terms come from the fact that we shift points in line 9 of algorithm 2 and the triangle
inequality. For each of the original demand points v ∈ D, let the cluster center in OPT closest to v be OPTv,
and let the point in C closest to V be denoted cv. We see that
d(cv, OPTv) ≤ d(v, cv) + d(v,OPTv)
by the triangle inequality. Since OPT of the original k-medians problem is a candidate solution for the
new k-medians problem, the objective cost of using OPT upper bounds the optimal cost. Summing over all
v ∈ D, we see that the objective cost of shifted demand points is therefore bounded as∑
v∈D
d(cv, OPTv) ≤
∑
aiti + OPT
since
∑
aiti is an upper-bound approximation of the cost of shifting the demand points to centers in C, and
the sum of d(v,OPTv) yields exactly OPT. Thus, the first two terms come from the cost of shifting the real
demand points, and the last term comes from the Laplacian noise.
Note that there may be a better solution than the original k-medians’ OPT to this new k-medians
problem, but this is consistent with the bound by inequality.
Lemma A.7. (Lemma 4.7) With high probability, algorithm 2 preserves (ǫp, δp) differential privacy and
solves the k-medians problem with cost
O (M(1 + ǫ))OPT +O
(
Mk∆
ǫp
lnn
(
ln
(
e
δp
)
+
ln(1/ǫ)
ln(1 + ǫ)
))
where the black-box k-medians algorithm used in the last step of algorithm 2 has approximation factor M and
ǫ is a small, positive constant.
Proof. Combine the results of lemmas 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6, we see that with high probability the optimal cost
of the k-medians problem at the final line of algorithm 2 is given by at most
(2− ǫ− 2ǫ2
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
OPT +
(4∆k ln(1/ǫ)
ǫp
(
ln(n)
ln(1 + ǫ)
+ 2
)
+
24k lnn ln
(
e
δp
)
ǫp(1− ǫ− ǫ2) +
1− ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
∆.
For simplicity, we will use big-O notation going forward, so this is the same as
(2 +O(ǫ))OPT + O
(
k∆
ǫp
(
ln(n)
ln(1/ǫ)
ln(1 + ǫ)
+ lnn ln
(
e
δp
)))
.
Since the k-medians algorithm used at the last line has approximation factor M , the objective cost of
the shifted k-medians problem is M times that result. To obtain the objective cost for the original problem,
we see that for any demand point v ∈ D, the distance between v and a center is at most d(cv, v) and the
distance from cv to a center, by triangle inequality. Therefore, the new objective cost only adds the shifting
cost on top of the modified k-medians problem’s objective cost, which only slightly affects the factor in front
of OPT:
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(2M + 1 + (M + 1)O(ǫ))OPT +O
(
Mk∆
ǫp
(
ln(n)
ln(1/ǫ)
ln(1 + ǫ)
+ lnn ln
(
e
δp
)))
which simplifies to the claim.
Lemma A.8. (Lemma 5.2) In any metric space and p ≥ 1, (d(a, b))p ≤ 2p−1 ((d(a, c))p + (d(b, c))p).
Proof. Since the function f(x) = xp is convex over non-negative reals, and distance is a non-negative function,(
d(a, c)
2
+
d(b, c)
2
)p
≤ 1
2
(d(a, c))
p
+
1
2
(d(b, c))
p
.
Hence,
(d(a, b))
p ≤ (d(a, c) + d(b, c))p
≤ 1
2
(2d(a, c))p +
1
2
(2d(b, c))p
≤ 2p−1 ((d(a, c))p + (d(a, c))p)
The first inequality follows from the triangle inequality, and the second follows from the convexity claim
above.
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